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 5 
 Does Public Service Television Really Give 
Consumers Less Good Value for Money than 
the Rest of the Market? 
 Patrick  Barwise 
 Why do we still have public service television (PST) when commercial broadcasters 
and online TV companies now off er consumers so much choice? Th e obvious answer 
is that people are citizens as well as consumers: for policy reasons, we want to ensure 
the availability of public service programmes that off er social, cultural and political 
benefi ts and economic externalities but are not commercially viable. Despite dis-
agreements about scope, scale, governance and funding, the idea that there should be 
 some PST for ‘citizenship’ reasons is not seriously disputed in most countries, the USA 
being perhaps the main exception. 
 Among some commentators, however, this ‘market failure’ argument – the mar-
ket’s under- provision of some kinds of programme – is now the only continuing jus-
tifi cation for PST.  In the words of British economist Helen Weeds,  ‘ [t] he rationale for 
public intervention in broadcasting must now rest on citizen concerns’. 1  Many others 
would broadly agree. 2  
 Th e Conservative government’s position also seems to refl ect this view. A 2016 
White Paper argues that ‘[t] he BBC has faced questions in recent years, including 
about … its distinctiveness, the market impact of its more mainstream services … and 
its effi  ciency and value for money… [It should] focus its creative energy on high quality 
distinctive content that diff erentiates it from the rest of the market’. 3  Th e White Paper 
frames broadcasting policy as a kind of balancing act between citizen and consumer 
interests: for citizenship reasons, we need some PST to address gaps in provision; but 
for consumer reasons, we should minimise its cost and market impact. 
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 One practical problem with this view is that it assumes a clear- cut distinction 
between popular/ commercial and minority/ non- commercial programmes. Th e real-
ity is much fuzzier and less predictable:  what could be more ‘minority interest’ than a 
baking competition? Yet  Th e Great British Bake Off  turned out to be a huge hit. 
 At a deeper level, the key assumption underpinning the ‘market failure’ argument 
is that, whatever its citizenship value, PST off ers less good  consumer value for money 
(VFM) than the rest of the market. Th is chapter explores this assumption in the UK 
context. Th e main analysis completely ignores the citizenship benefi ts of PST, treat-
ing it as if it were just a consumer product like baked beans. At the end of the chapter, 
I briefl y return to the citizenship issues and discuss the policy implications. 
 The UK Market Context 
 I here defi ne a public service broadcaster (PSB) as a broadcaster governed, managed 
and regulated to achieve a diff erent or broader set of public interest goals than maxi-
mising shareholder value. Th is is not a black- and- white concept.  For instance, all UK 
broadcasters, apart from online- only TV services such as Netfl ix, operate under – and 
almost always comply with – the Ofcom Broadcasting Code, designed to protect chil-
dren, avoid undue harm and off ence, ensure accurate, impartial news, and so on. 4   As 
well as the BBC – publicly owned and largely funded by compulsory licence fees – the 
 UK’s diverse and highly competitive TV system includes two other sets of broadcasters: 5  
•  Commercial PSBs: the publicly owned Channel 4 (C4) and privately owned ITV and 
Channel 5 (C5), all mainly funded by advertising 6  
•  Non- PSBs: a combination of platforms, channels and online- only services, mainly 
funded by subscriptions and advertising. 
 Th e BBC and C4 are ‘pure’ PSBs with detailed public service remits; ITV and C5 
are also defi ned as PSBs because they have agreed to deliver some public service 
objectives (in addition to those in the Ofcom Broadcasting Code) in exchange for 
privileges such as access to spectrum at a lower price than they would have to pay in 
a competitive auction. 
 Method 
 Th is chapter is about the relative consumer value for money of PST (BBC TV and 
the commercial PSBs) and the non- PSBs. Consumer VFM is a familiar concept in 
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marketing and consumer policy, usually measured by simply asking consumers, who 
typically have no diffi  culty interpreting the question and relating their responses to 
their own buying behaviour, perhaps with some post- rationalisation. In thinking 
about the diff erent brands, they know that they are broadly comparing like with like 
or, at most, trading off  price and quality within a category, for example when compar-
ing a premium brand with an economy brand. 
 Evaluating the consumer VFM of television is less straightforward because it is rarely 
bought one programme, or even one channel, at a time; much of its funding comes from 
advertising; and diff erent broadcasters have quite diff erent revenue models: 
•  BBC TV is mainly funded by a compulsory  licence fee which also funds BBC Radio, 
BBC Online, the BBC World Service, and much of the cost of broadband rollout, 
the Welsh public service channel S4C and local TV.  Also, all households with one 
or more members aged over 75 get a free TV licence (regardless of household size 
and income). 
•  Th e commercial PSBs are mainly funded by advertising. 
•  Pay TV is mainly funded by monthly subscriptions, supplemented by advertising, 
for a package of channels, increasingly bundled with apps, DVRs, catch- up services, 
telephony, broadband, etc. 
•  Online- only TV services are funded by a mixture of subscriptions, advertising and 
one- off  payments (pay- per- view, rentals, download- to- own). 
 We can, however, infer a lot from a combination of consumer behaviour (‘revealed 
preference’), consumer costs and selected attitudinal data. To illustrate, consider the 
overall consumer VFM of UK television. 
 The Overall Consumer VFM of UK Television 
 Consumers’ revealed preference suggests that most see television as excellent VFM – 
so much so that almost every household chooses to have a TV set (95.5% of all house-
holds in late 2016 7  ) and/ or access to an online TV service (including an unknown 
proportion of the other 4.6%). At a minimum, the direct cost per household is the 
£12.25/ month BBC licence fee 8  and the cost of a TV set and electricity. 
 Watching TV is extremely cheap by any standards. Robert Picard and 
I  estimated that, in 2012, the direct consumer cost per viewer- hour (CPVH) – 
subscriptions, the TV proportion of the BBC licence fee, and one- off  payments – was 
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9.2p. Including the indirect cost of TV advertising (discussed later), it was still only 
13.5p/ hour. On a comparable basis, the cost per consumer- hour was roughly 50p 
for fi xed and mobile telephony, tabloid newspapers, paperback books and ‘free’ 
advertising- funded online services (including the cost of broadband). For magazines, 
quality newspapers and DVDs it was signifi cantly higher than that; for most out- of- 
home leisure activities (restaurants, pubs, cinemas, etc) much more again. 9  
 Of course, these fi gures do not mean that these other activities represent poor 
VFM – the experiences are not closely comparable with everyday TV viewing. But the 
low cost of television clearly helps explain its huge and continuing popularity. Only 
radio listening worked out even cheaper, at only 1.9p per listener- hour. 
 Testing the ‘Market Failure’ Assumption 
 Using the same broad approach, we can start to test the ‘market failure’ assumption 
that UK PST – certainly the BBC and perhaps the commercial PSBs – off ers less good 
consumer VFM than the rest of the market. We can observe consumers’ revealed pref-
erence at two stages: 
•  Adoption:  households deciding whether to pay for access to any TV; and, if so, 
whether also to subscribe to (basic or premium) pay TV 
•  Usage: individuals then deciding which programmes to watch. 
 Th ese are very diff erent. Th e fi rst is an occasional household choice involving money. 
Th e second is a constant series of individual choices (albeit often negotiated with other 
household members) and rarely involves money. Both throw light on the ‘market failure’ 
assumption about the relative consumer value for money of PST and the non- PSBs. 
 On the fi rst point, adoption, as already noted, almost all households choose 
to have access to TV content, including the small but growing minority who watch 
only online. Th e proportion of households with access to TV content who, over any 
extended period, watch no PST is unknown but certainly very small, skewed towards 
light- viewing, young, upscale online- only households without children. 
 Among the over 95% of UK households with TV sets able to receive broadcast TV, 
in late 2016: 10  
•  45.1% had no pay TV (including a majority of low- income households, who rely 
disproportionately on PST) 
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•  33.6% had basic pay TV costing £20– 30/ month on top of the £12/ month BBC 
licence fee 
•  21.3% had premium pay TV, i.e. sport and/ or movie packages costing £20– 40/ 
month on top of the cost of basic pay TV and the BBC. 
 Because consumers legally have to have a TV licence in order to have pay TV, 
and a basic pay TV package if they want premium pay TV, these fi gures do not show 
their willingness to pay for each option separately. But they do show that, although 
over 95% of households regard TV as good VFM, a large minority of these (45% of 
TV households) do not regard even basic pay TV as cost- justifi ed as an addition to 
PST; and only about 21% think premium pay TV off ers good enough VFM to justify a 
subscription. 
 Turning to the second type of revealed preference, usage, viewers switch between 
their favourite channels at no additional cost and seamlessly – although nudged by 
their EPG 11   – with little or no distinction between PSB and non- PSB channels. 
 In 2016, BBC TV had a total viewing share of 32% among all UK individuals aged 
4+ while the commercial PSBs (including their portfolio channels) had a combined 
share of 38% and the non- PSBs the remaining 30%. PST was therefore still extremely 
popular, accounting for 70% of viewing. 12   To assess its relative VFM, however, we also 
need to take account of, fi rst, costs, i.e. the direct and indirect consumer cost per 
viewer- hour (CPVH) and, second, perceived quality. 
 The Cost per Viewer- Hour (CPVH) 
 We can estimate the CPVH of a specifi c (type of) broadcaster by dividing its direct and 
indirect cost to consumers by its viewing hours. We have good data on viewing hours 
but estimating the consumer cost involves two assumptions: 
 1.  Th e consumer cost of BBC TV is the proportion of licence fee revenue allocated to 
it, including proportionate overheads 
 2.  Th e indirect consumer cost (or opportunity cost) of TV advertising is equal to com-
mercial broadcasters’ net advertising revenue (NAR)  – that is, the revenue they 
receive from media agencies. 13  
 Using these assumptions, Robert Picard and I estimated the following CPVH fi g-
ures in 2012: BBC TV 9.2p, commercial PSBs 8.0p, non- PSBs (excluding online- only 
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services) 24.9p. 14  We can now update these estimates to 2016 – see  Table 5.1 . Th e fi rst 
two columns show weekly revenue (£m/ week) in 2012 and 2016. Column 3 then shows 
the ratio between these: 0.96 for BBC TV (a 4% reduction in nominal revenue result-
ing from the 2010 funding settlement), 1.10 for the commercial PSBs (a 10% increase, 
mainly refl ecting the recovery in NAR) and 1.17 for the non- PSBs (mainly from higher 
revenue per subscriber). 15  Columns 4– 6 show the equivalent fi gures for viewing. Total 
viewing (scheduled programmes watched on TV sets, live or up to seven days after 
broadcast) decreased by 12%, from 28.1 to 24.7 hours/ week. 16   Most of this refl ected 
reduced PST viewing, leading to ratios of 0.86, 0.85 and 0.96, respectively, for BBC TV, 
the commercial PSBs and the non- PSBs. 
 Assuming changes in total consumer costs are proportional to those for broad-
caster revenue, we can use these ratios to update the 2012 CPVH fi gures to 2015: 
 BBC TV        9.2p x (0.96/ 0.86) = 10.2p 
 Commercial PSBs    8.0p x (1.10/ 0.85) = 10.4p 
 Non- PSBs       24.9p x (1.17/ 0.96) = 30.3p 
 Th ese estimates are approximate (+/ — 10%) because they are based on rounded 
revenue fi gures, but the qualitative picture is clear: as in 2012, the 2016 CPVH for the 
non- PSBs was almost three times as high as for the PSBs. Th e reasons are: 
 1.  Th e high cost of sport (and, to a lesser extent, movie) rights for premium pay TV 
channels. Th e £1,712m annual cost of live TV rights for Premier League football 
(ie excluding production costs) is now marginally more than the  total programme 
budget of BBC TV (£1,702m in 2015/ 16). 17  
 Table 5.1 
 Nominal Revenue and Viewing Hours per Week (Rounded): 2012 vs 2016. 21  
 Revenue  (£m/ week)  Viewing  (Hours/ week, all inds 4+) 
  2012  2016  2016/ 2012  2012  2016  2016/ 2012 
 BBC TV  52  48  0.96  9.3  8.0  0.86 
 Commercial 
PSBs 
 56  62  1.10  11.1  9.4  0.85 
 Non- PSBs  133  156  1.17  7.7  7.4  0.96 
 Total  240  265  1.10  28.1  24.7  0.88 
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 2.  Th e much higher non- programming costs of pay TV versus PST (marketing, distri-
bution, consumer equipment, installation, customer service). 
 3.  Th e non- PSBs’ signifi cantly lower availability. As already discussed, TV household 
penetration is only about 55% for pay TV and, within that, 21% for premium pay TV, 
versus 100% for PST. 18  
 4.  Finally, the market is highly competitive, forcing the PSBs to be much more effi  -
cient than they are sometimes portrayed. 
 Th e diff erence in total CPVH is probably somewhat less than this analysis  suggests 
because it excludes the unknown opportunity cost of the PSBs’ DTT (Digital Terrestrial 
Television) spectrum. However, even if we incorporated this, the general pattern – 
with the non- PSBs’ CPVH being much higher than for the PSBs – would be unaff ected, 
because of the above points. 
 Basic Multichannel, Premium Multichannel and Online- Only TV 
 Ideally, we would split the non- PSBs in  Table 5.1 into two groups: (a) basic satellite, 
cable and DTT platforms and free- to- air non- PSB channels (accounting for over 95% 
of non- PSB viewing); and (b) the  additional cost and viewing of premium sport and 
movie channels, since these are not sold separately from basic pay TV. 
 Because of the high cost of the premium channels’ content  – point 1 above  – 
and their relatively low availability and viewing levels, their CPVH is much higher 
than that of basic multichannel pay TV. But basic pay TV still has much higher non- 
programming costs and lower availability than PST – points 2 and 3 – so its CPVH is 
almost certainly signifi cantly higher than PST’s. 
 Unfortunately, Robert Picard and I  were unable to fi nd any published data to 
enable us to separate the CPVH of the basic and premium non- PSBs and I am still 
unable to do so. 
 Similarly, I  have been unable to fi nd reliable published data on the consumer 
cost and viewing of the online- only TV services. But, to illustrate, a household pay-
ing Netfl ix’s or Amazon’s entry- level £5.99/ month, with two adults each watching the 
service, on average, fi ve hours/ week, would equate to a direct CPVH of 13.8p. 19  Th e 
total CPVH would be signifi cantly higher if we include the indirect consumer cost of 
advertising and perhaps additional equipment and broadband costs as these video- 
on- demand services are extremely bandwidth- hungry. 
 Download- to- own box sets are slightly more expensive. For example the com-
plete  Mad Men costs £39.99 from Sky for 68 hours of content, which works out at 
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58.8p/ hour. Th e CPVH depends on how many people watch it how many times but 
if, say, two people watched every episode once, on average, the CPVH would be 
29.4p. 20   For pay- per- view sport and movies, the CPVH is likely to be signifi cantly 
higher again. 
 In summary, although we lack the data to make precise estimates, the evi-
dence is that, far from PST being more expensive than the rest of TV, it is almost 
 certainly  signifi cantly cheaper per viewer- hour than basic non- PSB multichannel TV, 
entry- level online- only TV or online box sets, and very much cheaper than  premium 
services such as sport and movie pay TV channels and online pay- per- view. 
 Perceived Quality: Audience Appreciation 
 Th e cost per viewer- hour is only part of VFM, however. Th e other is perceived quality, typ-
ically measured as audience appreciation. Until the mid- 1980s, with only four public ser-
vice UK channels, audience appreciation was routinely measured using self- completion 
diaries that asked respondents to say how ‘interesting and/ or enjoyable’ they found each 
programme they watched. Th e results were reported as a 0- to- 100 Appreciation Index 
(AI) for each programme. Most AIs were between 60 and 80. Among the general run of 
entertainment programmes, there was no evidence of ‘niche’ programmes attracting 
small but especially loyal and appreciative audiences. Instead, there was a ‘double jeop-
ardy’ pattern under which, for a given channel and time of day, lower- rating programmes 
tended to have lower repeat- viewing rates and audience appreciation than more popu-
lar ones. A secondary pattern was that, other things being equal, more demanding pro-
grammes tended to have smaller audiences but higher AIs because only viewers who 
liked them a lot were willing to invest the extra eff ort needed to watch them. 22  
 As far as I know, there has been no published research comparing the average 
audience appreciation of PSB and non- PSB programmes. But, based on the earlier 
studies, I  would be surprised if AIs were signifi cantly higher, on average, for pro-
grammes on the basic multichannels than on the PSB channels.  Th ere are two reasons 
why they might be  slightly higher, however. First, their viewers are people who have 
invested in pay TV, presumably because, other things being equal, they like televi-
sion more, on average, than do those who do not subscribe to pay TV. Second, as with 
demanding programmes on the PSBs, viewers will typically make the extra eff ort of 
switching to a small multichannel only if they expect to like the programme more than 
those showing on the main channels. Typically, this will happen when the multichan-
nel is showing a predictably enjoyable favourite programme. 
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 Th e appreciation of premium sport and movie channels and online pay- per- view 
(among those who choose to pay for them) may well be much higher than for either 
the PSBs or the basic non- PSB channels in order to justify their much higher CPVH. 
 For entry- level online- only TV, I have no solid basis on which to hypothesise. 
 The Relative Consumer VFM of PST 
 Based on the above analysis of adoption, usage, CPVH and audience appreciation, 
both BBC TV and the commercial PSBs most likely off er most consumers  better VFM 
than the basic non- PSB channels (including platform costs) that account for the great 
majority of non- PSB viewing – the exact opposite of the assumption underlying the 
‘market failure’ view. Th is provisional conclusion is based on the likelihood that, rel-
ative to the PSBs, the basic non- PSB channels’ signifi cantly higher CPVH (even after 
allowing for the opportunity cost of the PSBs’ access to spectrum) is not compen-
sated for by commensurately higher audience appreciation. Th is tentative conclusion 
is researchable. Th e relative consumer VFM of premium sport and movie channels, 
online pay- per- view and entry- level online- only TV is unclear: their much higher 
CPVH may or may not be fully compensated for by higher audience appreciation 
among those who subscribe to them. However, this too is researchable. 
 What about the signifi cant minority of consumers who have always said, in 
response to surveys, that the compulsory BBC licence fee represents poor VFM? 23  
A 2015 study 24  focused on this minority: the sample included 24 households saying 
they would prefer to pay nothing and receive no BBC services (representing 12% of 
UK households) and a further 24 households saying they would prefer to pay less for 
a reduced BBC service (representing 16% of UK households). Th e total sample of 48 
therefore represented the 28% of households who, at least to some extent, saw the 
licence fee as poor VFM. Th ese households then lived with no BBC services for nine 
days, after which they were re- interviewed and given £3.60 (nine times the 40p/ day 
cost of the licence fee). Over two- thirds (33 out of the 48) changed their minds, decid-
ing that the licence fee did, after all, represent good VFM. In contrast, only one out 
of a control sample of 22 households who, in the initial interview, had said the BBC 
represented good VFM went the other way, saying in the second interview that they 
now felt it represented poor VFM. 
 Th is study was based on limited samples but, if it generalises, the proportion say-
ing the licence fee is good VFM increases from 72% in the initial survey to 88% 25  once 
respondents experience life without the BBC for just over a week. Th ere has been no 
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equivalent study for other broadcasters but the results are certainly consistent with 
the above evidence that PST represents good VFM for UK consumers. 
 ‘Citizenship’ Benefi ts 
 Of course, PST also off ers citizenship benefi ts beyond those provided by the rest of 
the market. Th is chapter is about consumer VFM so I will discuss these only briefl y. 
Ofcom’s  PSB Annual Research Report 2017 found that, in 2016, most of the UK public 
valued the ten defi ned PSB purposes and fi ve PSB characteristics highly – and increas-
ingly over the fi ve years 2011– 2016. Th e highest importance ratings were for providing 
‘high- quality UK- made programmes for children’ (89% among those with children) 
and ‘trustworthy news’ (89% among all UK adults). Th e lowest, at 68%, was for dis-
tinctiveness (‘Th e style of programme is diff erent to what I’d expect to see on other 
channels’). A majority also said the PSBs were delivering on all these purposes and 
characteristics, ranging from 87% for high- quality UK children’s programmes down to 
61% for ‘distinctiveness’. 26  
 In summary, the UK public values the ‘citizenship’ purposes and characteristics 
of PST; does so increasingly; and believes that the PSBs are doing a good job deliver-
ing them. Th e characteristic on which they are least convinced on both importance 
and delivery is ‘distinctiveness’. As I have written elsewhere in a more general context, 
consumers see no value in a product being distinctive as an end in itself. Instead, they 
value products that are distinctive because they are ‘simply better’. 27  In line with this, a 
recent study for the BBC, unpublished at the time of writing, confi rms that audiences 
mainly interpret ‘distinctive’ as ‘distinctively good’. Unfortunately, the government’s 
White Paper appears to use ‘distinctive’ in the quite diff erent sense of ‘distinctively 
diff erent’. 
 Policy Implications 
 Th e above analysis shows that the key assumption underpinning the ‘market fail-
ure’ view – that PST off ers consumers less good value for money than the rest of the 
market, so that its only continuing rationale rests on citizen concerns  – appears to 
be simply wrong, at least in the UK. PST does, of course, give citizens public service 
benefi ts over and above those provided by the non- PSBs and online- only TV players, 
and these ‘citizenship’ benefi ts are highly valued by the public. But the numbers sug-
gest that PST  also off ers consumers better value for money because the non- PSBs’ 
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signifi cantly higher cost per viewer- hour seems unlikely to be compensated for by 
commensurately higher audience appreciation. 28  
 Th e main policy implication is simple: there is no necessary trade- off  between 
citizen and consumer benefi ts: pound for pound, PST appears to deliver both sets of 
benefi ts better than the rest of the market. Th is does not mean we should return to a 
world with only PST: the addition of non- PSB platforms and channels (now includ-
ing the online- only services) to what has so far been a strong, well- funded PST sys-
tem has hugely increased viewer choice and competition.  It does, however, mean 
that the relentless current reduction in the BBC’s real income, in particular, is now 
unambiguously against the public interest from both a citizenship  and a consumer 
perspective. 
 In 2014, Robert Picard and I showed what would happen if this reduction were 
continued until the BBC were reduced to nothing or a minor sideshow like PBS in 
America  – the logical conclusion of the ‘market failure’ view. Even, optimistically, 
assuming commercial broadcasters signifi cantly increased their investment in con-
tent, including fi rst- run UK content, in response to the BBC’s removal from the mar-
ket, we showed that the net impact would still be to reduce the range, quality and 
VFM of television for most households, as well as the income of UK producers and, of 
course, the citizenship benefi ts of PST. 29   Since then, the cuts in BBC income have, if 
anything, accelerated. 
 Th e assumption that PST off ers consumers less good VFM than the rest of 
the market is the cornerstone of the ‘market failure’ view: without it, the argument 
for further reducing the role of PST simply collapses. From a rational policy perspec-
tive, the onus should therefore be on those advocating this view to provide evidence 
that – contrary to the analysis here – this key assumption is correct, i.e. that PST does 
off er less good VFM than the rest of the market. 
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